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DNA – Intimate Information or Trash for Public Consumption?
“Surreptitious sampling” may be police officers’ trump card in cracking otherwise
unsolvable crimes as serious as murder, arson and rape. Law enforcement officers
engage in surreptitious sampling when they covertly collect DNA1 samples from
unsuspecting people, who inadvertently leave behind hair, skin cells, saliva or other
biological materials.2 Surreptitious sampling is a terrific crime-resolution tool. It allows
diligent law enforcement officers to collect proof-positive evidence of guilt or innocence
without the hassle of obtaining a warrant and absent probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to believe that the contributor of the biological evidence committed a crime.
Provided an officer has the energy and savvy to gather a hair or other biological sample
for testing, she can gather information with the potential to definitively link someone to a
crime. Not even a hunch is necessary to justify the quest; yet, DNA processing
technology “lets crime laboratories derive a full profile from a minute amount of
biological material at relatively low cost.”3 Perhaps because of its effectiveness and the
lack of legislative or judicial regulation of the practice, surreptitious sampling is growing
in popularity. Recently, the New York Times highlighted this evidence-gathering method.
According to the article, “Over the last few years, several hundred suspects have been
implicated by the traces of DNA they unwittingly shed well after the crime was
committed[.]”4

1

deoxyribonucleic acid
See Amy Harmon, Lawyers Fight Gene Material Gained on Sly, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3,
2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/science/03dna.html.
3
Id.
4
Id. See also State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 31 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (explaining how
officers on Seattle’s cold-case squad used a DNA sample obtained in a ruse to solve the
2
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Although great for solving crime, some contend that surreptitious sampling is a
tragedy for personal privacy and freedom because it threatens to expose significant
amounts of intensely private information about citizens’ health, gender, race and lineage
to the government.5 One federal district court judge remarked, “[T]he relative ease with
which a DNA sample may be obtained renders questionable the ability to realistically
protect any genetic privacy interest . . . .”6
This essay argues a middle position -- that the well-established Fourth
Amendment rule of “abandonment” can strike an appropriate, “reasonable” balance to
serve law enforcement needs for surreptitious sampling, while simultaneously protecting
citizen privacy.
The Query
Is surreptitious sampling constitutional? If so, are there any limits to restrict
officers from capitalizing on the increasingly public nature of everyday living? Do
officers act constitutionally, if they blend into a crowd and bump me as I enjoy a public
parade and, without my knowledge, pull several of my hairs for DNA processing? To

sexual assault and murder of a 13-year-old girl that had remained unsolved for twenty
years).
5
See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment
and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 857, 875 (2006) (arguing that surreptitious
sampling “is a backdoor to population-wide data banking”).
6
United States v. Owens, No. 06-CR-72A, 2006 WL 3725547, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 15,
2006) (unreported opinion). Id. at *10 (noting “that physical media containing human
DNA are, by their nature, regularly and involuntarily separated from the person”). See
also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 n.3 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting
that the privacy of a citizen is equally invaded by the type of physical entry “detested by
our forbears” or by devices made feasible by science, which accomplish an intrusion
from outside “private quarters”).
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protect our privacy, dignity and personal security from surreptitious sampling, must we
live as secluded as the Unabomber?7
The Law
Although police frequently collect and use surreptitiously acquired DNA,8 there
are still few judicial opinions on the topic and even fewer legal articles analyzing the
practice.9 The Supreme Court has yet to decide under what circumstances surreptitious
sampling may violate the Constitution. Thus, the handful of courts to confront challenges
to evidence obtained by surreptitious sampling have usually turned to general Fourth
Amendment10 principles for guidance on whether or not to exclude the prosecutor’s use

7

Theodore J. Kaczynski, commonly called “the Unabomber,” lived reclusively in a
remote, 10-by-12 foot Montana cabin about 50 miles northwest of Helena, Montana,
before he was arrested for mailing package bombs that killed three people and injured
twenty-three more. David Johnston, On the Unabomber Track: The Overview, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 4, 1996. The cabin lacked plumbing and electricity. Id. Kaczynski grew his
own food and chopped his own wood for warmth. Richard Perez-Pena, On the
Unabomber’s Track: The Suspect, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1996. Kaczynski rarely entered
civilization and did not pursue conversation when he did, taking care “to draw no
attention to himself.” Id. See also Edward J. Imwinkelried and D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing:
Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 413, 437-38 (2001) (“The deposition of
DNA in public places cannot be avoided unless one is a hermit or is fanatical in using
extraordinary containment measures.”).
8
See Harmon, supra, note 2.
9
See infra, note 11 (referencing some of the judicial decisions); Imwinkelried and Kaye,
supra, note 7 at 413 (noting that “courts have barely begun to focus on the legal
limitations on the power of the police to obtain samples directly from suspects” and that
“the permissibility of collecting DNA ‘abandoned’ in public places are being litigated for
the first time.”). See also D.H. Kaye, Science Fiction and Shed DNA,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2006/7; Joh, supra, note 5; D.H. Kaye, The
Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 Cornell J.L.& Pub. Pol’y 455 (2001).
10
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the government from conducting unreasonable
searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .”). Arguably, there are also due process limits on law
enforcement officers’ ability to surreptitiously sample. See, e.g., Iowa v. Christian, 723
N.W.2d 453 (Iowa App. 2006) (unpublished decision) (analyzing on due process grounds
motion to suppress DNA evidence obtained surreptitiously); People v. LaGuerre, 29
3
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of such evidence.11 One legal commentator contends that “[c]onstitutional law offers
virtually no protection” for those targeted for surreptitious sampling and that “existing
Fourth Amendment law is ill-suited to the facts of abandoned DNA collection[,]”12 but
this essay contends that courts are right to rely on basic Fourth Amendment concepts.
Fourth Amendment principles can strike an appropriate balance, allowing the government
to collect valuable evidence, while providing for reasonable boundaries to limit unduly
intrusive DNA collection.13 More specifically, courts can foster both law enforcement

A.D.3d 820, (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (same). But the due process limits are beyond the
focus of this brief essay.
11
See Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 356-357 & n.3 (Mass. 2007) (rejecting
defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge prompted by officers’ collection of three
cigarette butts and a water bottle gathered from an interview room inside the
Massachusetts Correctional Institution, where the defendant was incarcerated, one-half
hour after the defendant left the room to call his mother, finding that defendant “fail[ed]
to manifest any expectation of privacy in the items whatsoever”); State v. Athan, 158
P.3d 27, 31-34, 36 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (rejecting a defendant’s appeal of the denial
of a motion to suppress DNA evidence obtained from his saliva, although detectives
posed as a fictitious law firm and sent the defendant a letter inviting him to join a
fictitious class action lawsuit by returning a response letter from which officers obtained
a saliva sample for testing); Iowa v. Christian, 723 N.W.2d 453 (Iowa App. 2006)
(unpublished decision) (rejecting defendant’s motion to suppress DNA evidence
collected by police from a water bottle and a fork the defendant “voluntarily abandoned”
at the site of a job interview); Commonwealth v. Rice, 805 N.E.2d 26, 33 (Mass. 2004)
(denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence collected without a warrant, cause, or
consent from DNA on defendant’s bed sheets, his inmate uniform and t-shirt collected by
correction officers at the facility where defendant was held on unrelated charges,
concluding that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bed
sheets and uniform because they belonged to the county and that he abandoned any
expectation of privacy in the t-shirt when he surrendered it for replacement of a less-worn
shirt).
12
Joh, supra, note 5 at 863. See also id. at 880 (arguing that “greater restrictions than
exist now on the collection of abandoned DNA are advisable”).
13
Professors Imwinkelried and Kaye appear to agree that the Fourth Amendment may
protect society’s interests against some surreptitious sampling. See supra note 7 at 438
(“A case can be construed that [a reasonable] expectation [of privacy] exists” for DNA
inevitably left in public.).
4
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and privacy interests by applying the Fourth Amendment principles of voluntary
abandonment vigorously. I dub this test the “patent abandonment standard.”
The basic abandonment principle is found in California v. Greenwood, in which
the Supreme Court explained that a person loses Fourth Amendment protection in his
belongings by abandoning them.14 There, the Court held that law enforcement officers
do not implicate Fourth Amendment rights when they conduct a warrantless search of
opaque garbage bags left on the curb in front of a suspect’s home, reasoning that a
warrantless search or seizure of “the garbage bags left at the curb outside the [suspect’s]
house would violate the Fourth Amendment only if [someone] manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in th[e] garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable.”15
The Court concluded that any expectation of privacy in the contents of the opaque
garbage bags at issue was not objectively reasonable because the bags were: 1) “readily
accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public”;16
2) placed at the curb “for the express purpose of conveying it to . . . the trash collector”;17
and 3) “particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public
consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it[.]”18 In other words,
when someone knowingly and intentionally leaves his garbage or his biological matter
exposed to the public without exerting an effort to retain control of it, he loses all Fourth
Amendment protection for that trash, biological or not.

14

486 U.S. 35 (1988).
Id. at 37-38, 40.
16
Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 40-41.
15
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Especially instructive to potential limits on surreptitious sampling is the Supreme
Court’s use of active verbs to describe a person’s exposure of his belongings to the
public. According to the Court, a person loses his expectation of privacy only by
“le[aving]” the bags at the street to “convey[]” the refuse to the trash collector; by
“deposit[ing]” the garbage in an area suited to public consumption;19 by “knowingly
expos[ing]” the bags to the public;20 and by “’voluntarily turn[ing them] over to third
parties.’”21 In short, the Court has concentrated on the active, volitional, “patent”
abandonment of materials. Accordingly, when law enforcement officers surreptitiously
gather DNA from an unsuspecting person, who unwittingly turns over his or her
biological material to a third party and fails to voluntarily or actively make it “readily
accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public,” a
strong argument can be made that officers exceed Fourth Amendment limits and violate
reasonable expectations of privacy, unless they act with probable cause, reasonable
suspicion and/or a warrant.
Application of the Law to Surreptitious Sampling
Because a persuasive argument can be made that the Fourth Amendment
proscribes some surreptitious sampling, the government should be guided by a single
dominant standard when it engages in the practice. Officers should collect biological
evidence from a public place without probable cause or a warrant, only if and when
someone actively, voluntarily and freely abandons the biological matter.22 Such “patent

19

Id. at 40.
Id. at 41.
21
Id. at 41 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)).
22
Arguably, private spaces like the home and curtilage would require a separate analysis.
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (addressing Fourth Amendment
20
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abandonment” demonstrates that the person has relinquished any reasonable expectation
of privacy he may have had in the biological and otherwise highly personal matter.
Moreover, to strike the proper balance between law enforcement needs and privacy for
the people, the terms “freely” and “voluntarily” must be interpreted to have their normal,
colloquial meanings.23 Using common-sense definitions of these terms should ensure
that protection for citizens’ private information is not inadvertently lost every time
someone enters civilization to buy groceries, visit a friend or work.24
The government’s ability to gather intimate, biological material from its citizens
and use that material as evidence in a subsequent criminal proceeding should not reduce
interactions between citizens and their government to a playground game of finders
keepers, losers weepers. The issue should not be whether someone unwittingly lost his

protections in the setting of scientific advancements in the form of a thermal imager that
allowed law enforcement officers to collect information inside a home while remaining
outside the home). In addition, while it is tempting to argue that someone must
“knowingly” abandon his biological matter, it is doubtful that the average citizen knows
that the government is currently using these practices; therefore, such a requirement
probably tilts the balance too strongly against the government.
23
Freely should be construed as “without restriction or interference” or “willingly and
readily.” Oxford American College Dictionary 534 (2002). Similarly, voluntarily will
mean “given . . . of one’s own free will[.]” Id. at 1582.
24
Presuming that voluntary abandonment of biological material becomes “the” test for
whether or not law enforcement officers act constitutionally when they surreptitiously
collect biological material for testing, it will be imperative that courts remain objective
when evaluating abandonment. In particularly heinous cases, the natural urge will always
be to find abandonment. Therefore, to guard against subconscious leanings in favor of
the government’s efforts at crime resolution, judges should apply an “insurance/terrorist
test.” Specifically, judges should ask whether their notions of voluntary abandonment
would change, if instead of government agents collecting evidence to solve a crime, an
insurance company engaged in the same behavior to gather material to deny an insured’s
health-care coverage, or, to posit a more extreme example, if a known terrorist group
collected the same biological material to identify a candidate’s susceptibility to the
group’s influence. If the deciding court would reach the same result in all three settings
and conclude that the biological matter was voluntarily and freely abandoned, then the
court is ruling objectively, logically and, arguably, correctly.
7
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skin, hair or saliva. The more appropriate query is whether the person voluntarily left
such materials behind – a “patent abandonment.”
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